

looking ahead

A monthly report by the National Planning Association on forward-looking policy planning and research—unbiased, non-aligned, and completely at arm's length to the nation's future

Vol. 7, No. 6

September 1959

Communist Economic Strategy: The Rise of Mainland China

The following is a partial text of the NPA study, Communist Economic Strategy: The Rise of Mainland China, by A. Doak Barnett, the fourth study in a series prepared for the NPA Special Project Committee on The Economics of Competitive Coexistence.

A COMPETITIVE STRUGGLE of great long-run significance is now underway in the underdeveloped areas of the world. Communist China, as the largest and strongest Communist country in Asia, and as the most important ally of the Soviet Union, is a major participant in the competition. A realistic appraisal of Communist China's economic capabilities, its foreign economic policies, and its potential impact on other underdeveloped nations is therefore essential to any general assessment of world-wide economic competition now going on between the Communist bloc and the West.

While the succession of developments in Communist China has been rapid, and brash claims have been crowding each other in a relentless bid for world attention, uncontroversial facts are hard to come by. The Communists have completed their first Five Year Plan, and the resulting increases in production appear to have been sizable, even if the official claims are treated with caution. A number of independent appraisals suggest that average growth in national product from 1952 to 1957 was hardly less than 6 to 7 percent per annum, and it may well have been more.

The Domestic Economy

When the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, they inherited an underdeveloped economy which had been badly disrupted by years of war, inflation, and weak government. Modern industry was still in its infancy at the time of the Communist takeover and roughly four fifths of China's huge population was engaged in farming or in occupations closely related to agriculture. Methods of cultivation were intensive, but modern scientific techniques of farming were almost unknown to the average peasant. Output per acre was fairly high by Asian standards (outside Japan) but output per man was low and agriculture barely supported subsistence standards of life for the mass of the peasantry.

Even when prewar industrial production was at its peak, China was by almost any standard one of the least industrialized of all major nations. One symbolic

In This Issue—

COMMUNIST ECONOMIC STRATEGY: THE RISE OF MAINLAND CHINA

TWO DECADES OF GOVERNMENT INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL PROGRAMS

40 MILLION DISPOSSESSED

URBAN SPRAWL AND HEALTH

the people of NPA



25th

Anniversary Meeting

NPA's 25th anniversary meeting (1934-59) will take place this October 23rd at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D. C. with the Board of Trustees and the Agriculture, Business, Labor, and International Committees joining to explore key problems facing our country today.



indicator of this fact was that steel production never reached the level of one million tons a year. Furthermore, the industry which did exist had declined as a result of the war with Japan and its aftermath. Industry in the "treaty ports," which had passed into Japanese hands during the war and had subsequently been taken over for the most part by the Nationalist government, was seriously affected by the inflation and disruption of conditions caused by the Communist-Nationalist civil war. Industry in Manchuria was crippled by the Soviet removals of equipment as war booty and the destruction of equipment by looters, which took place in 1945.

In economic terms, the first task facing the Chinese Communists after 1949 was achievement of economic stability and the restoration of existing productive capacity. By stringent fiscal measures they were able to halt inflation. The establishment of unified political control, the repair of transportation, and the renewal of domestic trade, assisted the recovery of both agricultural and industrial output during the 1949-52 "period of restoration."

The Chinese Communists' drive to build modern industrial power took concrete form in their first Five Year Plan which was initiated at the start of 1953. During the years 1953-57, fulfillment of this Plan became the primary focus of national life in Communist China. But when the first Five Year Plan officially got underway in 1953, the Peking regime still had no detailed long-range plans and proceeded with a series of one year plans.

It was not until mid-1955 that the Chinese Communists asserted that they expected to fulfill the "fundamental task of the transition period" in three Five Year Plan periods. By this they meant that they hoped to have completely socialized China's economy and to have constructed a significant industrial base by 1967. At the same time, they recognized that industrialization in any full sense would require a much longer period, and that it would be 40 to 50 years before China could become "a powerful country with a high degree of socialist industrialization." The first Five Year Plan was to be the initial step on the long road to industrialization. It was clearly patterned on the Soviet model in its basic approach.

By the end of 1957 it was clear that in general terms the Peking regime had been able to achieve many of the overall objectives of the first Five Year Plan, and that it had exceeded numerous goals in the field of industrial development. The Chinese Communists now claimed that the gross output of industry and agriculture rose more than 60 percent during the first Plan period.

Although the problem of translating Peking's official figures into terms meaningful to the West is a complex one, it is possible for Western economists to gather data from varied official Chinese Communist sources, cross-check them for consistency to some extent, and then make independent estimates of GNP, investments, and consumption in China using the criteria and methods accepted in the West. One such U. S. economist estimates that the rate of growth in China's GNP during the first Plan period was 11.0 percent

if computed in current prices, or 8.6 percent if computed in constant 1952 prices.

The Chinese Communists' basic approach to agriculture during the first Plan period focused upon institutional reorganization of farming to give the state maximum control over the peasants and the land. The land distribution program, an important feature of the Chinese Communists' struggle for power, was largely completed by 1952. However, the poor crop years at the start of the Plan led the regime to take increasingly drastic steps to achieve control over the peasants and their output. In 1953, a state monopoly of grain and nationwide rationing were instituted. Finally, in mid-1955, Mao Tse-tung decided to speed up collectivization in a dramatic fashion. A tremendous organizing drive took place, and during a period of about one year, over 96 percent of China's peasants were brought under control of a million agricultural producers cooperatives, and 88 percent were converted into "higher stage cooperatives" (collectives). By the end of 1956, Chinese agriculture was, for all practical purposes, collectivized and less than 5 percent of agricultural land in China remained under individual private proprietorship.

Communist China's entire industrialization program during the first Plan period was geared to and dependent upon Soviet promises to help build key industrial and related projects in China by providing large-scale technical assistance and by selling the Chinese essential equipment mostly on a barter basis and only partly financed by Soviet loans.

The Russians, however, seem to have been unwilling to assist the Chinese very substantially on carrying the financial burden of China's industrial development program. The Soviet Union has not given Communist China a single free economic grant as far as is known, and even the volume of Soviet loans and credits to the Chinese has been small in terms of China's economic situation and needs.

The only two long-term Soviet economic loans to Communist China which have been publicly announced were the 1950 and 1954 loans totaling \$430 million. In 1958, Peking did not receive any further foreign credits, and apparently it does not expect any in 1959. The two above-mentioned loans probably totaled less than half the value of Soviet removals and destruction of equipment in Manchuria in 1945.

The year of the "great leap forward," 1958, was also the year of communization during which the Chinese Communists started carrying out the most radical political, economic, and social reorganization ever attempted in so short a time by a large nation. One can only speculate about why the Chinese Communists decided to embark upon such a revolutionary program. It is possible that Peking's increasing difficulty from 1956 onward in importing capital goods required for large-scale industries from the Soviet Union without receiving commensurate loans may have led the Chinese Communists to decide that they should make greater effort to achieve their goals through total mobilization of China's population for labor-intensive development projects in both agriculture and industry.

No attempt is made, however, to disguise the harshness of sacrifice that is involved in the mass effort unparalleled in modern history. And whether one believes in the eventual futility of this effort or not, the West would do well to recognize the strength of the revolutionary impetus that is at work.

It is difficult to take at face value all the claims which Peking is now publicizing about the revolutionary events in Communist China during 1958, but even if substantially discounted they cannot be simply dismissed. They claim that output of both grain and cotton has been doubled, and that per acre yield of wheat jumped 71 percent and rice 122 percent in 1958 as compared with 1957.

Peking's claims in the field of industry in 1958 are only slightly less difficult to accept. For example, Peking claimed that during 1958, gross industrial output had increased 65 percent over 1957, and they asserted that steel production reached 11 million tons.

Foreign Economic Relations

Industrialization under Communist China's Five Year Plan required large amounts of imported capital goods, equipment, and raw materials, and to pay for needed imports the Chinese Communists had to export an increasing volume of agricultural and other products. Accompanying the overall growth in China's foreign trade, a radical change took place in the direction of Chinese trade, as the Communists reoriented China's economy away from the West and toward the Communist bloc.

Soviet figures indicate that in 1956 Communist China accounted for over one fifth of the Soviet Union's trade and ranked at the top of Moscow's trading partners in that year, surpassing even East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in importance. However in 1957, Communist China's trade with the Russians declined, while its trade with East Europe has steadily risen.

As Communist China's industrialization program has developed, and as its overall foreign trade has risen, Chinese Communist trade with free world countries has also increased steadily. Major limits on how far Communist China could go in actually expanding trade outside the Communist bloc have been imposed, however, not only by the Western trade restrictions but also by the integration of China's economy and foreign trade with the Soviet bloc. The fact that a large percentage of China's export capacity and foreign exchange has been definitely committed to pay for imports from the Soviet bloc was one of the reasons why relaxation of Western trade restrictions in 1957 did not result in any sudden, large jump in Communist China's trade with the West—to the disappointment of many of those who had been most vocal in calling for a lifting of the restrictions. Until the end of 1955, in fact, the increase of Communist China's trade with the free world was not as rapid as the rise in its trade with the Soviet bloc; but in 1956, for the first time, China's free world trade increased relative to its bloc trade.

During recent years, Communist China has probably utilized its sizable export surplus with the free world to help make up its deficit in commodity trade with the Soviet bloc, and also to buy some goods indirectly from the West through Soviet bloc countries in order to circumvent Western trade restrictions. In the past several years this export surplus in direct trade with the free world has averaged between \$100 million and \$200 million each year.

Perhaps the most significant recent development in the direction of Communist China's trade, in relation to free world areas, has been the substantial increase in the relative importance of countries in the Asian-African area compared with Europe and North America. By 1956, roughly two thirds of Communist China's total free world trade—including about one half of its free world imports and about 70 percent of its free world exports—were with countries in the Asian-African area. Peking has itself stressed the political significance of this trend.

Often the Chinese Communists publish figures or percentages in reference to trade with the Asian-African area as a whole, and they now claim that during Communist China's First Plan Period, trade with this area made up 16 percent of its total foreign trade. By comparison, trade with the West—that is mainly Europe—was said to be only about 9 percent. U. S. Department of Commerce figures indicate that Peking's trade with all non-Communist countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa totaled \$716 million in 1956, whereas its trade during that year with all OEEC countries (Western Europe minus Spain but plus Turkey) was only \$362 million.

The Chinese Communists have begun to penetrate Southeast Asian markets for manufactured goods on a fairly large scale, and the bulk of Chinese consumer goods exports as well as some of its capital goods exports are going to this area. In return, Communist China is receiving agricultural products and raw materials. This exchange of manufactured goods for nonindustrial commodities is the reverse of the overall pattern characterizing Communist China's total foreign trade. Although there is a sound economic basis for much of the trade—the Chinese Communists have frankly stated their belief that the development of trade relations with Southeast Asia is designed to promote closer political relations and increased Communist influence in that area.

The Chinese Communists claim that their trade with Southeast Asia rose 15 percent in 1955, and 40 percent in 1956. U. S. Government statistics indicate that between 1954 and 1957, Communist China's trade with the underdeveloped non-Communist nations in the Far East and Southeast Asia increased by over three quarters, at a rate three times as fast as the increase in Japan's trade with the region, though in absolute terms, Japan's trade with the area of \$2.3 billion in 1957 was nearly four times that of China. During 1958, there has been clear evidence of a major Chinese export drive in Southeast Asia. Although the exact dimension of this effort will not be wholly clear until final trade statistics for the year become available,

it has already cut into the markets for many products, including textiles, which Japan and India have developed in that region in the past.

One of the most remarkable developments in Communist China's economic policies during the first Five Year Plan period was Peking's decision to embark upon foreign aid programs of its own. It is a surprising fact that since 1956 the Chinese Communists, despite their great needs and problems domestically, have been giving much more financial assistance than they have been receiving. From the time Peking's first foreign aid program was started in 1953, and until 1956, all of Communist China's foreign aid was granted to neighboring Communist states. But since 1956, the Chinese Communists have extended economic assistance to a number of free world countries, and have assumed a place in this aspect of economic competition with the West as well as in the current trade competition between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

The total amount of Communist China's foreign assistance during the first Five Year Plan period was substantial. It probably totaled about \$647 million, although part of this may have been merely a write-off of Chinese costs incurred in assisting the North Korean regime during the Korean conflict.

This figure seems doubly striking since Soviet financial assistance to Peking has been on a loan rather than on a grant basis. In addition to this grant aid, furthermore, Peking during the first Plan period gave one long-term loan of \$25 million to Hungary, and during late 1957 and early 1958 it offered long-term loans to Burma, Yemen, Indonesia, and Ceylon.

The fact that Peking has been steadily increasing its foreign aid program during recent years, despite all of its domestic problems and balance of payments difficulties, is convincing testimony to the fact that Chinese Communist leaders regard foreign economic aid as an important instrument of their foreign policy. Already Communist China must maintain a sizable export surplus in its balance of payments, and to increase or even to continue the present level of China's foreign aid programs, Peking will have to expand its export surplus still further, adding to the burdens imposed upon China's domestic economy and increasing the economic sacrifices demanded of the Chinese people—unless the Soviet Union decides to raise the level of its economic aid to Communist China.

There can be no doubt that Communist China's domestic economic development and foreign economic policies present a serious challenge to the free world, a challenge which the West cannot fail to take into consideration in formulating economic policies for the future.

(Communist Economic Strategy: The Rise of Mainland China, A. Doak Barnett, National Planning Association, Washington, D. C.: Copyright 1959, 120 pp., \$2.50.)

—The People of NPA—

Oscar
Heline



Colvin-Heyn Studio

Oscar Heline, long-time member of NPA's Agriculture Committee and member of the Special Committee, Technical Cooperation in Latin America, lives on and operates the same Iowa farm on which he was born. He began active management of his family farm when 19 years of age, and has developed a substantial operation of diversified farming and livestock feeding.

In 1910, he became interested in cooperatives as director of the local elevator, and helped to organize the Farm Bureau in his county, as well as its state and national organizations. For ten years, Mr. Heline was on the Farm Bureau State Board—1918-28—and he served as President of the Farmers Grain Dealers Association of Iowa from 1930-56.

Long active as a national farm leader, Mr. Heline has also served as President of the Farmers Elevator Company—1945-56, was president of the National Coop Elevator Association, trustee of American Institute of Cooperatives, director of National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, and was an original member of the State and National Corn-Hog Committee of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Currently Mr. Heline is Director of the Farm Credit Banks, Omaha District, a position which he has held since 1941, and is also a Director of the National Corn Growers Association.

Mr. Heline's activities in public affairs and agriculture are not confined to the national scene. In 1943 he spent three months in the United Kingdom as consultant to the Foreign Economic Administration studying agricultural conditions with reference to Lend Lease shipments. He was also a delegate to the Canadian American Conference of Foreign Relations at Niagara Falls, Ontario in 1951, and was a member of the Committee of American Assembly at Columbia University in 1955 on farm policy. In 1946, Mr. Heline received the Register and Tribune Award for Leadership in Iowa. He is the author of the NPA Joint Statement, "The Food and Agriculture Organization," and is joint author, with Donald Kaldor, of the NPA study, *A Framework for Long-Range Agricultural Policy*.

40 Million Dispossessed

The American opening of the World Refugee Year on July 1, 1959, was anticipated by the publication of a study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *We Strangers and Afraid*. The author, Elfan Rees, is Chairman of the Executive Committee of the International Committee for World Refugee Year.

Covering the world refugee situation in considerable detail, the study points out that since 1945, over 40,000,000 more people have become refugees because of world political, social, and economic conditions. This movement, not yet finished, is endemic in our time, states Dr. Rees.

In probing the consequences of the entrance of these migratory strangers into a country of asylum, Dr. Rees points out the political, social, and economic issues which must be considered. The pattern of these issues varies in character from group to group and from one community of asylum to another. Therefore, he cautions, it is dangerous to generalize as to the consequences on society of the refugee problem. But, Dr. Rees adds, "we shall make no progress without the recognition that the refugee constitutes the largest single humanitarian issue of our time. Until we consider the consequences of flight to them and the effect of refugeedom upon them, we shall never have the preception to help them to a solution nor the understanding that will at least minimize the impact of that solution upon our own concept of order and good life."

In discussing placement of refugees, the Dr. notes two prominent problems: the struggle of the refugee to recover his former economic status and to integrate into his adopted community. In this connection, he states that "it cannot be overemphasized how much the ultimate fate of the refugee depends on the character of his reception and the measure of help he receives."

Although the consequences of an influx of refugees upon a country may be negative in the short run, in the end the country will generally benefit from their skills, observes Dr. Rees. The Turkish government, for example, estimates that it invests \$2000 in an average refugee family of five persons, but by such an investment some of Turkey's arid plains have been transformed into "flourishing farmlands." Finland also, notes Dr. Rees, has seen the "economic potential of the new accessions of kindred people."

The burden of an integration program must of necessity fall upon the country of asylum, but it is an "absurd *non sequitur*," states Dr. Rees, to assume therefore that international financial assistance to the countries of asylum is unnecessary. The aid given by the U. S. government to assist in settling refugee problems in Germany, Vietnam, and Korea, the combined British and U. S. aid in the Near

East, and the British aid in Hong Kong are outstanding examples of the recognition of the necessity of financial contributions by humanitarian governments. But, "the generosity of the few but emphasizes the unconcern of the many for other countries' refugee problems," concludes Dr. Rees.

(*We Strangers and Afraid*, Elfan Rees, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York: 1959, 72 pp., 50¢ per copy, reduced rates for quantity orders.)

Urban Sprawl and Health

The many problems in health and related fields posed by the growth of the great metropolitan centers in the United States were examined at the 1958 Forum of the National Health Council in Philadelphia. *Urban Sprawl and Health*, the published proceedings of this Forum, reveals the wide range of complexities in urban health planning and covers a variety of topics such as the effect of urbanization on private medicine and dentistry, the impact of urban sprawl on community planning for hospitals, and the status of mental health in urban and suburban areas. The Forum also explores new ways to support research, the problems of coordinating voluntary and official organizations in health planning, the lag between health knowledge and its application, and the effect of urban sprawl on local public health departments.

Luther H. Gulick, Member of NPA's Board, and Steering and International Committees, in his address to the Forum, calls for imaginative leadership in the field of urban health planning. He states that we should stop thinking in terms of outmoded urban stereotypes, for example the "wicked city," and should reorient our thinking to the actual conditions of the time if we are to understand the impact of urban sprawl on health. In his concluding remarks Mr. Gulick states that "No modern nation which has a five-day week, and talks about a four-day week and more leisure, is too poor to modernize its urban structures, especially if it has four percent and more of the working force unemployed. We are not short of cement and steel and money. We are short of clear thinking, political, social and business leadership, and appropriate government institutions, plans and decisions."

(*Urban Sprawl and Health*, National Health Council, New York: 1959, 228 pp., \$1.75.)

Government International Cultural Programs

THE HIGHLIGHTS of 20 years of U. S. government activities in international cultural relations have been reviewed by the Committee on Educational Interchange Policy. This Committee was established by the Institute of International Education in 1954 and "its responsibility is to study and report upon the whole area of exchange persons. . . ." The purpose of its recent report, *Twenty Years of Government Programs in Cultural Relations*, is to stimulate a "more comprehensive and definitive" study, in this field, of the "aims of government programs, the assumptions on which they are based, and their relation to private effort."

Prior to 1938, the report notes, American cultural cooperation was primarily in the hands of private persons and organizations. Since that time, however, the U. S. government has become increasingly aware of the potentials of cultural activities and has become involved in a variety of international programs.

Although the government's programs cover a wide range of activities including trade fairs and exchange study programs, they all have the same purpose: to create a better understanding of the United States abroad; and to introduce the cultures of foreign countries to U. S. citizens in hopes that it will contribute to international amity.

These activities have taken on a new urgency with the speeding up of technical progress, notes the study, and have promoted an exchange of knowledge and ideas among countries.

Three principles which all these U. S. government activities are based upon include reciprocity in relations, wide participation by nongovernmental groups and citizens, and the objective presentation of the United States to countries abroad.

These three principles, points out the study, are derived from American tradition, the nature of our institutions, and our democratic heritage. "They present our national culture, not as interpreted by or through an official body, but through cultural institutions and the people who created them. They help to make sure the process of communication is two-way, an interchange of knowledge and ideas among equals. They help to present a 'full and fair' picture of America abroad. They may never be fully applied in all programs, but they represent a goal worth striving for."

The Cultural Relations Division of the State Department was one of the first governmental organizations which took part in the cultural programs. Set up in 1938, the Division's purpose was to plan an integrated program for developing cultural ties with other countries. Working in conjunction with the Coordinator of Inter-American

Affairs, the Division helped stimulate U. S. colleges to offer scholarships to Latin American students, and provided additional financial assistance where necessary.

The report notes that technical assistance activities have been described by Arnold Toynbee as the greatest single idea in foreign policy to emerge from the twentieth century. Technical assistance programs were initiated in the United States in 1938 with the creation of the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation. The function of the Committee was to determine what knowledge and skills each executive department had that could be made available to Latin American governments. An original list of some 85 projects was drawn up. Many of these projects, the study notes, are familiar today, and include assistance to foreign countries in taking a census of populations, carrying out coast and geodetic surveys, and expanding agricultural production.

The activities and purposes of the Marshall Plan, Point IV, and the International Cooperation Administration, as well as the U. S. Information Agency and the Department of Defense are also reviewed.

IN EVALUATING the U. S. government's activities in cultural relations during the past twenty years, the study points out that U. S. programs which followed the three basic principles have been most successful where the principles were most faithfully followed. Of these, it adds, objectivity is the most difficult to achieve.

In conclusion, the study states that, "It is a credit to the foresight and statesmanship of the United States that the government has associated itself with this type of cultural relations program."

NPA members on the Committee on Educational Interchange Policy are Harlan Cleveland and Kenneth Holland, Members of NPA's International Committee and Lauren K. Soth, Chairman of NPA's Agriculture Committee and Member of the Board of Trustees and Steering Committee.

(*Twenty Years of United States Government Programs in Cultural Relations*, Committee on Educational Interchange Policy, New York: 1959, 32 pp.)

■ From 1948 to 1957, farm production per paid man-hour went up 48.6 percent while production per man-hour in nonagricultural industries went up 25.5 percent. The average annual increase of production for agriculture was 6 percent; for nonagriculture, a little under 3 percent, states a recent National Planning Association report.

Not-So-Ugly Americans in Japan

A MAJOR OBJECTIVE of the United States Information Service in Japan reports Don Frifield in an article recently released by the New York Herald Tribune Service, is to "convince the Japanese people that the U. S. is a worthy and necessary ally in the perennial cold war." In 14 major cities throughout Japan, the USIS, staffed by a corps of 50 Americans and 370 Japanese, is working hard "to create a favorable 'image' of the United States. To promote this "favorable 'image'," the USIS provides Japanese visitors with materials about American civilization and culture, maintains library facilities, gives free instruction in how to teach English, and shows films of the American way of life.

Noting that wide screen television and the movie industry in Japan have failed to make a dent in the flow of published reading material, Mr. Frifield states that Japan "reads, thinks and talks of important matters—and in recognizing this phenomenon, the USIS has won many new friends for the West." One USIS pamphlet, a translation of NPA's *The Economy of the American People*, has been adopted as an economic textbook by the Osaka University, points out Mr. Frifield. The USIS had to order 20,000 copies of the booklet to fill the unexpected demand.

Last year, 1,400 Japanese teachers participated in USIS-sponsored seminars on techniques of teaching English. These sessions were tape recorded by the USIS and are now available to interested persons through the American cultural centers and the Japan-American centers in Japan.

A MAJOR LAMENT of the USIS, one official said, is that "We can't tell the American public what we are doing, because Congress forbids us to propagandize our activities in the U. S. itself." This leads to many problems, especially in combatting the extensive Communist propaganda, adds the official, "which amounts to many times more than we can afford on our 2 million dollar annual budget—which is less than some big American soap companies spend on advertising, you know. But I think that America has enough intrinsic worth of her own to make up for this deficit. The best propaganda on earth, after all, is a good example—and for all her faults, America is a good country and the Japanese know it."

("Not-So-Ugly Americans Winning Propaganda Victory in Japan," Don Frifield, New York Herald Tribune Service, Copyright 1959, *Corpus Christi Texas Caller*, April 27, 1959.)

African Journey

"AFRICA DISTURBED" is a highly readable account of a recently completed journey through Africa by Dr. Emory Ross and his wife Myrta. There are few Americans who have known Africa longer or more intimately than Dr. and Mrs. Ross. The purpose of their most recent trip was to take a "look ahead" at that vast continent, now in a state of unprecedented economic, political, and social change. In particular, they hoped to provide answers to the question of what current changes in Africa are likely to mean not only for the Africans themselves but also for the next generation of Americans.

Through interviews with Africans from all walks of life in all parts of the continent, the Rosses outline a picture of the emerging new attitudes and ways of living which are replacing both the immemorial tribal societies and the transitional forms of the vanishing colonial period. While they do not minimize the seriousness of current and prospective problems, the Rosses are impressed with the constructive trends which are appearing in African life despite the burden of the past and the bitterness of the present.

T.G.

(*Africa Disturbed*, Emory and Myrta Ross, Friendship Press, Inc., New York: 1959, 192 pp., illustrated; cloth \$3.50, paper \$1.95.)

NPA is saddened to lose a good friend, William H. Stead, NPA National Council Member and consultant for various NPA special projects, who died on June 12 in Washington. A noted economist and educator, Mr. Stead was the author of the NPA studies, *The Task of Nonmilitary Defense and the Present Status of Planning*, and *Fomento, The Economic Development of Puerto Rico*, and contributed feature articles to NPA's *Looking Ahead*. He was the originator of an occupational dictionary that forms the basis for modern employment service work in the United States. Mr. Stead had formerly served as associate director of the U. S. Employment Service in Washington, as director of the Office of Natural Resources of the NSRB and as vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis. At the time of his death, he was the Director of the Business-Education Division of the Committee for Economic Development.

New Board and Committee Members

NPA welcomes the following members added to its Steering and Standing Committees since January 1958.

Agriculture Committee

ROY HENDRICKSON

National Federation of Grain Cooperatives

WILLIAM H. NICHOLLS

Chairman, Department of Economics and Business Administration, Vanderbilt University

RALPH S. YOHE

Editor, *Wisconsin Agriculturist*

GORDON K. ZIMMERMAN

Executive Secretary, National Association of Soil Conservation Districts

Business Committee

KARL R. BENDETSEN

Vice President, The Champion Paper and Fibre Company

GROVER W. ENSLEY

Executive Vice President, National Association of Mutual Savings Banks

RAY R. EPPERT

President, Burroughs Corporation

ROBERT FAEGRE

President, Minnesota and Ontario Paper Company

PAUL GEROT

President, The Pillsbury Company

FRED KORTH

President, Continental National Bank of Fort Worth

DWIGHT L. STOCKER

President, KVP Company

JOSEPH C. WILSON

President, Haloid Xerox Inc.

Labor Committee

T. WILBER WINCHESTER

Vice President, United Transport Service Employees

International Committee

JOSEPH E. SLATER

Ford Foundation

Steering Committee

ARNOLD S. ZANDER

International President, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO

NPA REPORTS, in addition to LOOKING AHEAD, are sent automatically to members of the Association. For information on membership, available publications and reports, write NPA Membership Department. LOOKING AHEAD is published 10 times a year. Permission is granted to quote from or reprint specific articles, unless otherwise stipulated, provided credit is given to LOOKING AHEAD and the National Planning Association.

NPA PUBLICATION STAFF

Editor of Publications: Eugene H. Bland

Editorial Consultant: Virginia D. Parker

Associate Editor: Berman Chang

Assistant Editor: Constance Pierson

Assistant Editor: Lynn Ray Hoopes

NPA OFFICERS: Chairman, R. E. Brown; Vice Chairman, Francis C. Brown; President, Eugene H. Bland; Secretary, Frank Arnold; Editor, Eugene H. Bland; Treasurer, Arnold S. Zander; Executive Director, Charles J. Brannan; Council Members: W. C. Brown, Assistant Chairman and Executive Secretary, John H. H. H.

looking
ahead

NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION

1606 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington 9, D. C.
Telephone: Columbia 5-7685 Cable: NATPLAN

Vol. 7, No. 6



September 1959

Form 3547 Requested



Non Profit Org.

U. S. POSTAGE

Paid

Washington, D. C.

Permit No. 1819

A NONPROFIT, NONPOLITICAL ORGANIZATION, ESTABLISHED IN 1934, DEVOTED TO PLANNING BY AMERICANS IN AGRICULTURE, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE PROFESSIONS

